Battle of Spotsylvania

By Tom Gladwell / GFSTEG@aol.com

NOTE: Tom sent me the "Battle of Spotsylvania"... Instead of reading it in the room, I've decided to "run" it as a continuing story so you all may read it... Jayne [EDITOR'S NOTE: This interesting tale originally appeared in four successive issues of the "Fireside".]

South and slightly east of the Wilderness area was another strategic crossroad at the village of Spotsylvania Court House. The place itself was just a sleepy hamlet, a handful of houses scattered carelessly about a country crossroad, but Federal possession would seriously endanger the Confederate line of communication to Richmond. " My object in moving to Spotsylvania," Grant wrote, " was two-fold: first, I did not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field."

Shortly after dark on May 7 Warren was ordered to pull out of line and proceed toward Spotsylvania Court House by way of the Bock Road, passing behind Burnside and Hancock's corps. Sedgwick would follow Warren by way of Chancellorsville and the Piney Branch Church Road to where it met the Bock Road. Burnside would march father east and take the Fredricksburg- Spotsylvania Court House Road. When the rest of the army had moved out. Hancock would follow Warren on the Bock Road. Sheridan and the cavalry had been ordered to clear the way.

During the day the Confederates had been alert for any movement that Grant might make. Lee's scouts informed him that the bridges across the Rapidan had been removed and the area around Germanna Ford abandoned. Obviously, then, Grant was not going to retreat as Hooker had done just a year ago. But when the Federal wagon trains started to move they raised a huge cloud of dust, as the roads were powder dry. So Grant was moving somewhere. If he was just changing base, he could be going to Fredericksburg, but, if he were moving south, his next immediate objective would undoubtedly be Spotsylvania. In either event, Lee decided he had better move his army to Spotsylvania, so he ordered a clearing cut through the forest from the Orange Plank Road to the road running from Orange to Spotsylvania in the area of Shady Grove Church. That night Longstreet's corps, now commanded by Anderson, was ordered to take the route to Spotsylvania. Hill and Ewell would follow Anderson as soon as they could.

For an army to make an all night march after two days of brutal combat and one day of nervous alert was no easy task, and much confusion existed that night. Warren reached Todd's Tavern on the Bock Road about 3 a.m. but here was halted as the road was blocked by Sheridan's cavalry, and a little farther on was Stuart's cavalry. It took several hours to drive the Confederate cavalry off and clear the road, and as Warren approached Spotsylvania Court House it was becoming daylight. But he never did reach it. The delay had enabled Anderson to take up an entrenched position on a slight rise, about a mile and a half northwest of the vital crossroads. In his Memoirs Grant stated:

But Lee, by accident, beat us to Spotsylvania. Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Fredricksburg, and so informed his government. Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps now commanded by Anderson to move in the morning (the 8th) to Spotsylvania. But the woods being still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and march directly on to his destination that night. By accident Lee got possession of Spotsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in Spotsylvania and between him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on the morning of the 6th: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th - 8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Warren assumed the enemy in his front was just Confederate cavalry that Sheridan had driven off earlier, so at 8 a.m. he sent John C. Robinson's division forward to the attack. Robinson, however, received a rude shock when he ran up against Anderson's entrenched troops and was driven back with heavy losses. Warren organized for another attack, but it took time as most of the men were by now near exhaustion after their all-night march. Just before noon he attacked again with his whole corps, but the attack was made piecemeal with one division at a time and consequently failed to dislodge Anderson. Grant, who was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get the rest of his army up, now ordered Sedwick, who was at Piney Branch Church, to Warren's support for another attempt. But Sedgwick for some reason was slow in getting up to form on Warren's left, and it was five o'clock before they could attack. But again the assault was made piecemeal and was not pushed on a wide front, probably because of the physical condition of the troops. During the fight Ewell appeared on the field and came into to line on Anderson's right. Hill's corps now under Early because of Hill's illness, would form on Ewell's right when it reached the field early the next morning.

That night Grant ordered Sheridan and his cavalry to make a raid around Lee's army to disrupt his communications with Richmond, and then proceed south to re-provision his forces from Butler's army south of the James River. Grant hoped that this would force Lee to send Stuart's cavalry after Sheridan, which in effect would protect the Federal, supply trains from Confederate cavalry raids. Lee did send Stuart after Sheridan, and in a later engagement of the two cavalry forces at Yellow Tavern, on the outskirts of Richmond, Stuart was mortally wounded.

The next day, May 9th, was spent mostly in getting the remainder of the army into position and entrenching, although sharp-shooting and skirmishing was heavy at times, and one of the casualties was the most liked general officer in the Army of the Potomac. In an effort to convince his men in the 6th Corps that the sharpshooter " couldn't hit an elephant at this distance," Sedgwick rode forward to an elevated position in his front and fell dead with a bullet in his head. General Horatio Wright then assumed command of the 6th Corps.

Later in the day, misled by reports that Lee was withdrawing from the Federal right, Grant ordered Hancock across the Po River to take Lee in flank and rear. Before Hancock could make contact, however, the mistake was realized and he was recalled. In re-crossing the river he was attacked by Early whom Lee had sent over from the Confederate right to block Hancock's advance. Hancock extricated himself from this dangerous position and then came into line on Wright's left. Burnside, meanwhile, had come down the Fredericksburg road and now held the extreme Federal left, next to Hancock.

Grant believed that Lee had weakened other parts of his line in order to drive Hancock back, so on the afternoon of May 10th he sent Warren and Wright to attack the left center of the Confederate position. Lee now had Anderson on his left opposite Warren and Wright, Ewell was in front of Hancock, and Early on the right faced Burnside. All were strongly entrenched behind powerful breastworks. There was one weak spot in the line, however. Ewell's entrenchment's jutted out in a U-shaped salient beyond the rest of the lines. Being elevated, it was a good spot for artillery, which was why Ewell wanted it in the first place, and he placed twenty-two guns there to hold it. It was nearly a mile deep and about half a mile wide. But the Mule Shoe, as the Confederates called it, made an inviting target. Colonel Emory Upton, of Wright's corps, was selected to lead the attack against the west side of the Mule Shoe with 12 picked regiments, to be supported by Mott's division oh Hancock's corps. Upton ordered the assault to be made with four lines of three regiments each. When the first line breached the salient, he ordered them to fan out to the left and right to take Ewell's troops in flank, while the other regiments coming up behind could go straight ahead through the opening to stop any reinforcements that might be sent up. Also, Also they were to make the initial charge across open field without stopping to fire and reload.

About 6 p.m. Upton's men charged out of the woods that concealed them, with a cheer, raced across the open ground and charged into the salient, the fading sun glistening on the steel bayonets. After some brief, but desperate, hand to hand fighting, the surprise attack succeeded, the plan working just as Upton had predicted it would. The impregnable line of earth works had been breached with a narrow but deep penetration, and about 1,000 of Ewell's men had been captured along with several pieces of artillery, Now if Mott's divisions charged through the opening promptly, the Army of Northern Virginia would be in a critical position. But, as Grant later wrote, Mott " failed utterly." Coming to Upton's support and with only about half a mile to go, Mott's troops came under heavy artillery fire, broke, and retreated in confusion. There was nothing left for Upton to do now but withdraw. He took his prisoners with him but was forced to abandon the guns he had captured. Grant promoted him to general on the spot, later confirmed by the President.

That night Wright told Meade, " General, I don't want Mott's men on my left; they are not a support; I would rather have no troops there." A few days later the division was broken up and Mott's brigades transferred to Birney's division.

Elsewhere the attack had not gone any better. Warren was beaten back and Wright could not make any permanent advances. The next day Grant wrote Washington: "We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I am now sending back to Bell Plain all my wagons for a supply of provisions and ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

Grant had been much impressed with Upton's success, and before starting another flanking movement around Lee's right decided to attack him in his entrenched position once more, Using Upton's tactics on a much larger scale against the same position. That afternoon he wrote an order to Burnside: " Major General Hancock has been ordered to move his entire corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 a.m. Of to-morrow, the 12th instant. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock tomorrow morning. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy, and veiled entirely from the enemy. Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by your and Hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself."

In the predawn darkness of May 12th rain set in, wrapping the area in a sullen mist. The drops ticked off the leaves monotonously as Handcock's and Burnside's men formed for the attack, stumbling through the dark and the rain and the mud. Their noisy approach alerted the Confederate pickets that this would be no small attack, and now Ewell's division and brigade commanders were really concerned.

Ewell was well aware that the apex of the salient was his weakest point and consequently had placed the twenty- two artillery pieces there. But Lee misled by a report that Grant was moving around his right flank again had ordered the guns to the rear ready to move quickly if necessary. Alerted by the reports of the pickets, they were now frantically galloping up to the front again in the rainy darkness, and would arrive just in time for twenty of them to be captured without having fired a shot.

In the early morning rain the massed Federal column hit the apex, Handcock's corps at the center and Burnside's on the east side. Francis Barlow, commanding Hancock's leading division, broke through, closely followed by Birney's division. The blue-clad troops poured through the gap and advanced. Without the necessary artillery support, Ewell's troops were forced back, losing the twenty guns in the process, in addition to General Johnson and about 3,000 of his men.

But then things began to go wrong for the Federals. Instead of fanning out to the left and right, as Upton's regiments had done, to widen the breach and enable Burnside to come through, they went straight ahead and jammed up. The supporting troops coming in behind them crowded up so closely that organization and control was just impossible and the 3,000 prisoners only added to the confusion. The delay enabled Lane's brigade of Hill's corps which was immediately on the right of the captured works, to fall back to an unfinished line in the rear and pour a telling flanking fire on Hancock's left, which stopped the advance. Then Gordon's division of Ewell's corps, which was being held in reserve, was thrown in front of the Federal column, slowly forcing Hancock's men back to the Confederate entrenchment's in their rear. About 6 a.m. Grant ordered Warren and Wright to Hancock's support, but another breakthrough was not achieved. In the initial assault Potter's division of Burnside's corps momentarily broke through the east side of the salient but was quickly driven out again by Early's troops who came over to their left to support Ewell.

Again, as in the Wilderness, Lee now appeared on the field to rally his men in this critical moment. If the assault succeeded, the Army of Northern Virginia might be cut in two and destroyed piecemeal. All day long and into the night the battle raged along the whole line with increasing fury. One Confederate officer remembered that " there was one continuous roll of musketry from dawn until midnight." Lee made five separate assaults in a vain attempt to recover his position. Although he failed in this, the Confederates did hold so that he could have new works constructed at the base of the Mule Shoe to straighten out his line.

A few hundred yard west of the salient the Confederates made a slight bent to the south, known as the "angle", and later as the " Bloody Angle." Here the men of Wright's corps came face to face with Ewell's veterans in a vicious hand-to-hand fight. Clubbed muskets and bayonets were used freely, as the rain poured down in sheets and the trenches ran red with blood. In some places the wounded and dying of both sides were trampled into the mud to drown or suffocate in the frenzied fighting. " The flags of both armies waved at the same moment over the same breast-works," one soldier noted, " while beneath them Federal and Confederate endeavored to drive home the bayonet through the interstices of the logs." Colonel Potter, of Grant's staff, later described the scene as he remembered it. " The battle near the 'angel' was probably the most desperate engagement in the history of modern warfare, and presented features which were absolutely appalling. It was chiefly a savage hand-to-hand fight across the breastworks. Rank after rank was riddled by shot and shell and bayonet-thrusts, and finally sank, a mass of torn and mutilated corpses; then fresh troops rushed madly forward to replace the dead, and so the murderous work went on. Guns were run up close to the parapet, and double charges of canister played their part in the bloody work. The fence-rails and logs in the breastworks were shattered into splinters, and trees over a foot and a half in diameter were cut completely in two by the incessant musketry fire. A section of the trunk of a stout oak-tree thus severed was afterward sent to Washington, where it is still on exhibition at the National Museum."

Despite the intensity of the battle, neither side could advance, and later that night Lee's men withdrew to their new line at the base of the salient. Then a tragic silence settled over the bloody field. In the dark woods surgeons were busy amputating by the eerie glow of lanterns. The next day Potter again visited the area of the heaviest fighting. " Our own killed were scattered over a large space near the " angle," while in front of the captured breastworks the enemy's dead, vastly more numerous than our own, were piled upon each other in some places four layers deep, exhibiting every ghastly phase of mutilation. Below the mass of fast-decaying corpses, the convulsive twitching of limbs and the writhing of bodies showed that there were wounded men still alive and struggling to extricate themselves from their horrid entombment. Every relief possible was afforded, but in too many cases it came too late. The place was well named the " Bloody Angel!"

A comparative lull settled over the area for the next several days, as each army tried to catch its breath and the rain continued to pour down. " Since the 3rd we had been marching, fighting, and building earthworks so continuously," wrote a soldier in the 13th Massachusetts volunteers, " that no opportunity had been afforded to change any of our clothing," On the 16th Grant reported to Washington: '' We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of its clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather." He had suffered over 17,000 casualties at Spotsylvania Court House and he now requested replacements be sent to him. But he did not want anyone in Washington to get the idea that he intended to stop fighting or retreat. " You can assure the President and Secretary of War," he wrote. " That the elements alone have suspended hostilities and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part."

Grant was gradually getting to know the Army of the Potomac and, more important, the caliber of its generals. He was becoming dissatisfied with Burnside and Warren for their dilatory tactics and lack of drive and initiative. There seems little doubt that had they attacked at Spotsylvania with the force and coordination that Hancock and Wright used, the Army of Northern Virginia might very well have been destroyed. Of Warren he later wrote: " Warrens difficulty was two fold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occurred to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to cooperate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did get ready, to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence."

Although he did not seem to realize it, a similar criticism, in a sense, could be leveled at Grant. As General Humphreys wrote later: There were two officers commanding the same army. Such a mixed command was not calculated to produce the best results that either singly was capable of bringing about. It naturally caused some vagueness and uncertainty as to the exact sphere of each, and sometimes took away from the positiveness, fullness and earnestness of consideration of an intended operation or tactical movement that, had there been but one commander, would have had the most earnest attention and corresponding action."

And Lee by now was getting to know Grant. He had no illusions anymore about Grant retreating, even after his heavy losses in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania. He was acutely aware that Grant was probably just waiting for replacements before again moving south. On the 18th he sent a long dispatch to Jefferson Davis describing the situation as he saw it: Grant's position is strongly entrenched, and we cannot attack it with any prospect of success without great loss of men which I wish to avoid if possible. The enemy's artillery is superior in weight of metal and range to out own, and my object has been to engage him when in motion and under circumstances that will not cause us to suffer from the disadvantage. Neither the strength of our army nor the condition of out animals will admit of any extensive movement with a view of drawing the enemy from his position."

Then he told Davis, " The importance of this campaign to the administration of Mr. Lincoln and to General Grant leaves no doubt that every effort and every sacrifice will be made to secure its success. " In effect, he was warning the Confederate Government in Richmond that Grant would get all the replacements and supplies he needed in order to continue to carry the war to the South, regardless of the casualties Lee might be able to inflict along the way. He was also implying that with an election coming up in November, Lincoln could not afford to let the Army of the Potomac retreat again, regardless of its losses. And, although his casualties at Spotsylvania were unknown, Lee informed Davis that if Grant was to be kept away from Richmond the Army of Northern Virginia had to have reinforcements. " The question," he warned, " is whether we shall fight the battle here or around Richmond. If the troops are obliged to be retained at Richmond I may be forced back."

As early as the day after the hard fighting at the salient, Grant had decided that he would again move around Lee's right flank rather than attempt to attack him in his entrenched position. He wrote Meade: " I do not desire a battle brought on with the enemy in their [position of yesterday, but want to press as close to them as possible to determine their positions and strength. We must get by the right flank of the enemy for the next fight.'' That night, the 13th Warren and Wright pulled back and marched behind the rest of the army to a new position east of Spotsylvania Court House. The heavy rains then held up further movement. Lee, of course, then extended his right to meet this shift. On the theory that Lee had probably weakened his left and center by this move, Grant agreed to another assault against the salient. On May 15th Hancock, supported by Wright, made a last attempt to break Ewell's line, but this time the attack was blasted by thirty massed cannon and beaten back before it even reached the Confederate position. The next day Ewell tried to find a weak spot on the Federal right flank but was quickly repulsed, although the attack did delay the departure of the Federals for another twenty-four hours. During the night of the 20th the Army of the Potomac once again was put in motion, sliding leftward and southward, always edging closer to Richmond, on the long road to the North Anna, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Richmond, Appomattox, and the end, the end of the long dying.

I hope you all enjoyed my telling of the Battle of Spotsylvania and part of Grant's '64 Campaign.

Tom